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This paper examines Aristotle’s concept of happiness as encapsulated in his
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that happiness is the supreme practical good
because it is perfect, final, self-sufficing and complete in itself. For him, happiness
is simply defined as rational eudaemonism (an activity of the soul according to rea-
son in contrast with mere sensual pleasure). In view of the foregoing, this paper
raises the question of whether happiness is actually an end as Aristotle posits.
What is happiness and how can we find it? Our objective is to critically evaluate
Aristotle’s position on the questions raised here and to see whether we can
develop a new moral thesis that can truly reflect our existential realities. Although
Aristotle’s position gives us a moral leap and is quite commendable in its ethico-
epistemological profundity, this paper, however, maintains that happiness is an
elusive concept. It argues that if at all anything termed happiness exists in this
world, it might only be transient, ephemeral and illusory and cannot be seen as an
end in the physical absolute terms when viewed from the standpoint of Plato’s
metaphysical dualism. The paper also argues that Aristotle did not say enough
about what we are supposed to do to attain happiness. He gives detailed
descriptions of many of the virtues, moral and intellectual, but with a persistent 'air
of indeterminacy'. The paper concludes that moral virtues are a necessary
component, but not a sufficient condition for happiness.
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Introduction
Apart from his profound reflection on other branches of philosophy, one core area which drew
the attention of Aristotle is the larger and vaguer problems of conduct and character. Interesting-
ly, above all the questions that border on the physical world looms the fundamental ethical ques-
tion of what is the good life? What is the highest good? Why be good? What is virtue and what
does it take to live a virtuous life? What is happiness and how can we find it? Aristotle’s answers
to these questions constitute what is known as his ethics. The word “ethics” is a derivative of the
Greek word ethos which means character or custom. The derivative phrase ta ethika was em-
ployed by Plato and Aristotle in describing their personal studies of Greek values and ideals (So-
lomon 1984: 3).
Aristotle was primarily concerned with the details of everyday normative ethics of conduct
and character, unlike Plato who was more interested in the most meta-ethical questions such as
the definition of the Good and the Just (Justice). Probably, there has never been a more compre-
hensive work on the subject of ethics than that of Aristotle. He wrote two major treatises on eth-
ics, namely the Nicomachean Ethics, said to have been edited by and named after his son
Nichomachus, and the Eudemian Ethics which differs in some significant respects from the
former (Solomon 1984:66). The Nicomachean Ethics is by far the better known of the two treatis-
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es. Any discussion on the areas of divergence between them is, however, beyond the scope of
this paper. For the purposes of clarity, this paper will refer to the Nicomachean Ethics as the
“Ethics”.
Aristotle’s treatise on ethics is characterised by a sort of down to earth, common sense ap-
proach that captures the “moral intuitions that we bring to philosophy” (Lawhead 2002:80). From
his standpoint, ethics is distinctively teleological and constitutes a body of objective knowledge,
though not as exact or precise a science as mathematics owing to the peculiarities inherent in
human nature. Human beings, for him, just as every other thing in the natural world, have a dis-
tinctive moral end to actualise. In the opening page of the Ethics, Aristotle posits that “Every
practical science has an end. The ultimate end, which is the supreme good” (Ethics BK1,1).
From this perspective, it is clear that he sees ethics as a practical science of human conduct the
function of which is to guide people towards the goal of achieving human excellence. The stated
purpose of Aristotle’s ethical treatise is to describe “the good for man”. It is less involved than
many modern ethical treatises in the justification of the values and institutions described. It
seemed sufficient, Aristotle thought, to simply describe such values, for their virtues seems to
speak for themselves (Solomon 1984:66).
Moreover, ethics and politics are for Aristotle two mutually inclusive but interdependent
phases of one line of inquiry. Ethics is an inquiry into how men may best live, and since men can-
not live well in solitude (without organised social relations), ethics finds it completion in politics
(Lamprecht 1955:61). However, his justification of the institution of slavery as being essential to
the just society and the exclusion of women from political life seems to be a blind acceptance of
the prejudices of the age and culture he lived.
Happiness as an intrinsic end (the highest good)
Aristotle begins his “Ethics” by frankly refuting Plato’s idea of good as basis for ethics because it
is disproved by the doctrine of categories. Plato’s idea of good, he argues, is “not relevant to
ethics, since a transcendent good is unattainable, and useless even as a guide to the attainment
of practical goods” (Ethics BKI, I2). He contends that happiness is the supreme practical good
because it is perfect, final, self-sufficient and complete in itself. Put in a syllogistic form:
i. Every practical science has an end 
ii. Ethics is a practical science
iii. Therefore, ethics must have an end.
Aristotle frankly recognises that the aim of life is not goodness for its own sake, but happiness.
He makes the general point that the Good must be the good for man, which in turn means that
toward which all human activities ultimately aim. This highest or ultimate good (the summum
bonum) is identified by Aristotles as “happiness”. He used the Greek word eudeimomia for the
moral end men ought to pursue. Ordinarily, this word is translated into English as “happiness” or
"human flourishing" but its meaning is much the same as what Plato meant by the Greek word
we translate as “Justice”. The word “happiness” has to do with the complete well-being of the
mature and excellently developed man (Lamprech 1955:61). The emphasis, here, is on activity
and accomplishment rather than a mere feeling of contentment or satisfaction (Solomon 66). The
nature of happiness according to Aristotle is not necessarily that of “the life of enjoyment”
“amusement” or “the life of money-making”. This means that happiness in the Aristotelian sense
is not equivalent to pleasure (which is sensual), though the two words are sometimes used
interchangeably in modern English. Pleasures can be sub-divided into good pleasures and bad
pleasures respectively. They may be “parts of human happiness or of its antithesis” (Lamprech
1955:61). Some kind of pleasure may lead to pain while some kind of pain may lead to pleasure
on the long run. Pleasure, therefore, is not the ultimate end as happiness. Given the primacy
2.  It's a reference to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We simply refer to it as Ethics. Since it was written in separate Books, 
we abbreviate each as Bk, for example (Ethics, Bk1: 258).
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Aristotle attached to happiness (an activity according to reason) as the ultimate, moral end men
ought to pursue, we may term his ethical position as rational eudaimonism or ethical teleologism
respectively.
Two types of goods: extrinsic good or instrumental good / intrinsic good or 
ultimate good
Aristotle identifies two types of ends human activities are directed. On one hand, therefore some
kinds of activities that merely serves as necessary means for the achievement of other and
extrinsic in nature. On the other hand are acts that are desirable not for the sake of something
else, but are rather desirable in themselves because of their intrinsic worth. These types of ends
are called intrinsic or ultimate ends. They are activities which do not aim at any result beyond the
mere exercise of the activity. This is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to
do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. Since happiness lacks nothing
and is self-sufficient and something desirable in itself, it is therefore an intrinsic end.
The only problem with the foregoing is that there is no consensus among people as to what
kind of life is most happy. Aristotle examines some conceptions of good life namely pleasure
(amusement, life of enjoyment), life of money-making, success and honour and rejected them.
He, however, concedes that it is not possible to lead the good life completely without them for
they are necessary conditions for actualizing the ultimate good (Uduigwowen 2001:131). 
Happiness as an end
Happiness, Aristotle maintains, is activity chosen for its own sake, but it must be activity
manifesting virtue or excellence, not merely pursued for amusement (Ethics BK 10, 258). The
peculiar excellence of man that makes him biologically unique among other earthly beings is life
of reason. It is by this that he surpasses and rules all other forms of life; and as the growth of this
faculty has given him supremacy over other however beings, Aristotle presumed that its
development will give him fulfilment and happiness. Therefore, what is happiness for man is not
only what is natural to him, but what is unique to him as well. Invariably, the good for man (or
eudaimonia) must be the life of reason. But whereas many might think the life of reason
(contemplation) is a sedentary academic life, Aristotle submits that it is also the active life, the life
“rational activity”, not a retreat from life (Solomon 1984:67). Thus, one of the central concepts of
Aristotle’s Ethics – the concept of virtue – is defined simply as “rational activity, activity in
accordance with a rational principle” (Ethics BK1, 7). Therefore, happiness does not consist in
pastimes and amusements but in activities in accordance with virtue. But if happiness consists in
activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the
highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us (reason). It is the activity of this
rational part of us “in accordance with the virtue proper to it that constitutes perfect happiness”
(Ethics BK 1, 7). This is a life such as we might conceive the gods to lead, “being relatively the
divinest part of us”, and hence, men become most god-like when they practise the life of
contemplation in which happiness consists.
Rationality as the highest virtue
For Aristotle, happiness consists in activity which accords with the highest virtue - which is
reason, and this rationality is inherent in human nature, unlike lower animals. What sets us apart
from everything else in the world is our rationality. Our ultimate good, he argues, consists in the
excellent use of our rational powers (Landau 2012: 261). Aristotle modified somewhat Plato’s
analysis of human nature and consequently, Plato’s list of virtues. He pointed out that human
nature has many irrational elements (the appetites, passions, emotions) and also a rational
principle. The irrational (or rather non-rational) elements of human nature are in part beyond the
power of reason to control and are in part subject to control by reason (Lamprecht 1955: 62).
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Aristotle identified three parts of human nature considered as the raw material for transformation
in accord with the highest good or happiness, namely:
i. the irrational part which is not subject to rational control
ii. the irrational part which is subject to rational control
iii. the rational part.
Corresponding to the above outlined three parts of human nature will be three kinds of
excellence and three ways by which happiness is achieved (if all it comes).
i. Corresponding to the irrational part which is not subject to control by reason is natural
excellence. This is the product of luck or good fortune. It is not properly to be called
virtue because those who do not have it cannot be blamed for their unfortunate
condition. For example, the nature excellence of beauty in contrast with ugly or the tall
with the short.
ii. Corresponding to the irrational part which is subject to control by reason is moral virtue
or moral excellence (Lamprecht 1955:63). Moral virtue is a habit of right action (a fixed
disposition) formed by acting rightly in conformity with right principle furnished by
reason. Aristotle argued the “none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature,
no natural property can be altered by habit” for (Ethics Bk 11, 35). For instance, it is
the nature of a stone to move downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards,
even though you should try to do so by throwing it up into the air ten thousand times.
Similarly, fire cannot be trained to move downwards. Nothing else that naturally
behaves in one way can be trained into a habit of behaving in another way. Therefore,
moral excellence or goodness of character is engendered in us neither by nature nor
yet in violation of nature, “nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this
capacity is brought to maturity by habit” (Ethics Bk 11, 35). This means that
experiencing happiness involves both thinking and doing. One must rationally judge
what are the right principles to follow and then discipline his/her appetites, feelings and
emotions in a habitual manner to those rules. What Aristotle called moral virtue is
equivalent to what Plato called temperance, but Aristotle’s treatment of the matter is
much more pluralistic (Lamprecht 1955: 63). We shall come back to this in his doctrine
of the moral mean.
iii. Corresponding to the rational part of human nature is the third type of excellence
called intellectual virtue or excellence of intelligence. This is achieved through
teaching and sustained reflection. Intellectual virtue has many forms according to the
subject-matter with which reflection is occupied (Lamprecht 1955: 64).
In all, Aristotle believed that contemplative activities (thinking, learning, striving to understand
and know) rather than pleasures and other external things are the key source of happiness for
humans (Barcalow 1994:71). This is to say that the highest good for humans is a life of
contemplation, a life guided by reason. Other external goods like "good birth, satisfactory
children, beauty" and good friends contribute to happiness but they are secondary. 
The doctrine of the golden mean: the key to happiness
Like Plato, Aristotle defines a good human character in terms of moderation, justice and courage
which are deemed virtuous by him (Kolak 1998: 193). He opines that virtue or moral excellence
depends on clear judgement, self-control (temperance), symmetry of desire and artistry of
means. The word "excellence" is probably the fittest translation of the Greek arête, usually
mistranslated virtue. The Greek arete is the Roman virtus (Latin); both implying a masculine sort
of excellence (Ares, god of war; vir, a male). Classical antiquity conceived virtue in terms of man,
just as medieval theology conceived it in terms of woman (Durant 1961:60). Aristotle holds that
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moral virtue consists of cultivating habits which will spontaneously incline us to take the middle
course of action (Stumpf 2003: 94).
Human beings have many impulses and desires, each of which begs for satisfaction but
none of which, Aristotle suggests, should be permitted, to have ascendency over the other. The
path way to moral virtue or excellence, therefore, is the middle way or the golden mean. This is to
say that moral virtue is realised at the point where we hit the mean (the moral bull eye). The
qualities of character can be arranged in triads, in each of which the first and last qualities will be
extremes (deficiency or excess) and vices, and the middle point quality a virtue or moral
excellence. Virtue, therefore, is impaired by excess or deficiency in action.
The Aristotelian mean described above, however, is not absolute, like the mathematical mean,
an exact average of two precisely calculable extremes, since ethics in not an exact science. The
moral mean fluctuates with the collateral circumstances of each situation, and discovers itself
only to mature and flexible reason (Durant 1961: 61). Moral virtue is a habit of choosing the rela-
tive mean in actions and emotions. The virtues are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in
violation of nature. According to Aristotle, nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this
capacity is brought to maturity by habit. The faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first
in a potential form and we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. We learn an art or craft by do-
ing certain things; men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on the harp. Sim-
ilarly, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing
brave acts (Ethics Bk 8:31).
The above table implies that achieving the golden mean depends solely on training and
practice that is long enough to eventuate in the formation of strong habits (the young and
immature are to be guided). Consequently, by consistently acting in virtuous ways, we acquire
habits of virtue. The possession of well-established habits is what we mean by character but
character is inherently good or bad depending on the nature of the habits. Character is,
therefore, the result of habituation – a long and consistent period of moral training. A man of
Table of virtues and vices
Class of action or feeling 
(Activity) Vice (Excess) Virtue (Mean) Vice (Deficiency)
Fear and confidence Rashness Courage Cowardice 
Pleasure and pain Profligacy Temperance Insensitivity 
Giving and getting small amounts 
of money Prodigality Liberality Meanness 
Giving and getting large amounts 





Anger Irascibility Gentleness Spiritlessness
Truthfulness about one’s merits Boastfulness Truthfulness Self-depreciation 
Pleasantness in social 
amusement Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness 
Pleasantness in social conduct Obsequiousness Friendliness Surliness
Shame Bashfulness Modesty Shamelessness
Pleasure in others misfortune Envy 
Righteous 
indignation Malice
Reward Sloth Ambition Greed
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virtue or good character is one who acts directly, consistently and reliably in accord with his
established habits. One can only be considered virtuous if he acts consistently (not a hit and run
manner) in accordance with the golden mean over a considerable stretches of time, perhaps in
the light of the entire course of his life (Lamprecht 63-64). In Aristotle’s words:
... this activity must occupy a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make a spring;
nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not
make a man supremely blessed and happy (Ethics Bk 8:13).
It is obvious that the doctrine of the moral mean is the formulation of a characteristic
attitude which appears in almost every system of Greek philosophy (Composta 1988:34). For
example Plato had it in mind when he called virtue harmonious action; Socrates when he
identified virtue with knowledge. The seven Wise Men had established the tradition of
moderation by engraving, on the temple of Apollo at Delphi, the motto meden agan; - nothing in
excess. Perhaps, as Nietzsche claims in his work The Birth of Tragedy, all these were attempts
of the Greeks to put in check their own propensity to violence and impulsiveness of character. To
be more precise, they reflected the Greek notion that passions are not of themselves vices, but
the raw material of both vice and virtue, according as they function in excess and disproportion,
or in measure and harmony (Lamprecht 1955: 62).
Happiness and friendship
The golden mean, Aristotle said, is not all of the secret of happiness. We must equally have a fair
share of worldly goods, for poverty makes an individual stingy and grasping. Possessions, on the
other hand, give one that freedom from care and greed which is the source of aristocratic ease
and charm. The noblest of these external aids to happiness is friendship (Durant 1961: 62).
Aristotle clearly states that “friendship implies virtue; and is valuable as a means to the
good life, as natural, as the bond if society, and as morally noble” (Ethics, BK 8, 203). Happiness
is multiplied by being shared and is more important than justice: for “when men are friends, jus-
tice is unnecessary; but when men are just, friendship is still a boon”. “A friend is one soul in two
bodies”.
Friendship, Aristotle argued, is not only indispensable as a means, but also noble in itself.
Friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as
some benefit accrues to them from each other. Similarly, those whose friendship is based on
pleasure see it as a means, for we enjoy their company not because of what they are in
themselves, but because of utility.
Hence, in a friendship based on utility or pleasure men love their friends for their own good
or pleasure, as someone useful or agreeable. Friendship of this nature merely serves an
instrumental purpose and not for its intrinsic worth or value. Such kind of relationship is based on
an accident in so far as the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as affording some benefit
or pleasure as the case may be. Consequently, friendship of this kind is fluid and can easily be
disengaged in the event of the parties involved changing and ceasing to be pleasant or useful to
each other as earlier enjoyed.
Because utility is not a permanent quality, friendship built on it changes from time to time.
When the motive or purpose of such friendship has been satisfied being ephemeral, the
relationship itself loses its valid ground for existence and is dissolved, having existed merely as a
means to that end. Friendships of utility, according to Aristotle, seem to occur most frequently
between people of old age who prefer to pursue profit that pleasure and also between those in
the prime of life and young people whose object in life is gain (Ethics, 207-208).
The perfect form of friendship, he argues, is that between the good, and those who
resemble each other in virtue, “ for these friends wish each alike the others good in respect of
their goodness, and they are good in themselves” (208). It is those who wish the good of their
friends for their friends’ sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for
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themselves and not accidentally. Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to
be good, given that virtue is a permanent quality. “Each is good relative to his friend as well as
absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely and profitable to each other” (Ethics Bk 8,
209). Such kind of friendship, he opined, is naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the
attributes that friends ought to possess. Such virtuous friendship is of course rare, because such
men are few.
The nature of virtue and taxonomy of virtues 
In addition to our discussion on Aristotle's doctrine of the Golden Mean, it would suffice us to take
a closer look at the nature of virtue, the taxonomy of virtues, and the relationship between virtues
and inclinations. In Aristotle's view, virtues are excellences of character, trained behavioural
dispositions that result in habitual acts. Virtues are those excellences of character that make up
the good life and sets us apart from animals. Virtue ethics is not only about actions but about
emotions, character, and moral habit. As Taylor puts it, it is an ethics of aspiration rather than an
ethics of duty (1985:5). It requires us to aspire to be ideal persons (Pojmam 1999:163). A
traditional term for a good person is "virtuous", but for a bad person, the term "vicious" is used.
This reflects the idea that a good person has good moral qualities referred to as 'virtues" while a
bad person inclines towards "vices" (Barcalow 1994: 92). A virtue is a character trait, not a mere
habit, or tendency/inclination to act in certain ways. It is a virtuous character that defines a
person and not just his/her mere habits. Some people are habitually inclined to performing
certain good acts like being generous and courageous but may lack virtue because they do not
really understand why it is appropriate to act in such a way. Virtues goes with knowledge and
wisdom, (as in Socratic/Platonic tradition), about what is needful and important, and why. On the
other hand, inclinations are defined as certain patterns of behaviour we engage in, but which we
may not thoughtfully do, or accomplished through the exercise of our rational powers. In addition
to rationally and routinely acting right, the virtuous person also has a distinctive set of moral
perceptions, thoughts, and motives (Landau 2012: 258-259). For example, a generous person
will, definitely, perceive, think, feel, and act differently from a stingy person. His/her motive for
giving will also be different. We can offer similar accounts of all of the other virtues. Courage, for
example, demands that we correctly perceive various threats and dangers, control our fear in a
reasonable way, be motivated by a noble end, and act accordingly. Though Aristotle views
courage primarily in the context of citizen's discharge of his civic and military obligations, this
virtue, like all others, is relevant in a number ways to our contemporary existential situations.
Virtuous people are defined not just by their actions but also by their inner life. This principle
compares with Kant's concept of the "Goodwill". According to Kant, if a man does what is right
simply because he likes doing that kind of act (for instance, being generous), that is, if his
inclinations led him in that direction, or because doing so serves his self-interest, there would be
nothing morally admirable (or virtuous) about him (Kant 1967:214). A virtuous agent perceives,
thinks, feels and acts differently from a person who is vicious. As Landau puts it, "People are
virtuous only when their understanding and their emotions are well integrated. A virtuous person
who understands the right thing to do will also be strongly motivated to do it, without regret or
reluctance, for all the right reasons" (Landau 2012: 258). From Aristotle's standpoint, as well as
from that of the modern virtue ethical tradition, the foregoing is what clearly differentiates the truly
virtuous from the merely "continent" - that is, a person who manages to do right things, but with
little or no pleasure or justifiable reason, and only does so by suppressing very strong contrary
desires. In this regard, Aristotle states that "Virtuous conduct gives pleasure to the lover of virtue"
(Ethics Bk 2: 33). Conversely, pleasure without virtue is not worth pursuing because it is vicious. 
On the taxonomy of virtues, it is important to state that traditionally, virtues have been
divided into two types, namely: moral virtues and non-moral virtues. The criterion for this
demarcation stems from whether they are intuitive or tied to moral principles (Louden 1992: 6).
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Moral virtues include; honesty, benevolence, nonmalevolence, fairness, kindness,
conscientiousness, gratitude, and so forth. The second type of virtues, that is, non-moral virtues
include; courage, optimism, rationality, self-control, patience, endurance, industry, musical
talent, cleanliness, wit, and so forth (Pojman 1999: 163). This notwithstanding, the exact
classification of various virtues is quite controvertible. Hence, we may not have a water-tight
compartmentalization of these virtues because they sometimes overlap. Courage, for instance,
is sometimes placed in the "moral" category. Similarly, kindness (as opposed to impartial
benevolence), and self-control might fit into both categories. Virtues that are tagged "moral", are
more closely linked with what has been considered essential for the moral life and incompatible
with the immoral life (Pojman 1999:163).
Aristotle's virtue ethics and contemporary moral theories
The issue which Aristotle appears to conflate is the contemporary demarcation between
normative ethics and metaethics. In normative ethics, we are concerned with norms of good
conduct (that is, moral acts involving substantive moral judgements), whereby we judge actions
as good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, obligatory or impermissible, and so forth
(Thompson 1976:29). It has to do with the traditional way of evaluating actions based on laid
down rules, norms, mores or moral laws within a given society (Ozumba 2001: 74). The second
level of ethical consideration has to do with the fact that, in ethical discourses, we make use of
concepts which beg for clarification. This second dimension, which bothers on linguistic analysis,
is the major preoccupation of contemporary ethics. To some extent, Aristotle's doctrine of the
Golden Mean is analytic because of the rational thinking and weighing of options involved in
moral decision making by agents. 
However, Aristotle's virtue ethics (aretaic ethics), is teleological because it focuses on the
end result of our actions (happiness). Moral principles or duties, here, are derived from the
virtues which are the dominant moral considerations. This view is supported by Philippa Foot,
Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Taylor. Aristotle's virtue ethics pre-dates the deontic view which,
at contemporary times, focuses on action guiding principles which it considers as the essence of
morality. Unlike, Aristotle's virtue ethics, deontologic ethics sees virtues as being derivable from
principles, which are instrumental in performing right actions. According to this view, each virtue
has a corresponding principle that generates it. This position can be found in the works of William
Frankena, Bernard Gert, Alan Gerwirth, John Rawls and Geoffrey Warnock. The third position is
the complimentarity school, which holds that both Aristotle's virtue (aretaic) ethics and Kant's
duty (deontic) ethics are important, complementary and are necessary components for an
adequate or complete ethical system. Those who hold this view include, Robert Louden, Walter
Schaller, and Gregory Trianosky ( see Pojman 1999: 166-167).
In contemporary times, virtue ethics has reemerged as a major ethical theory owing to the
growing dissatisfaction with the 'principle' governed (action centred) ethical systems. A number
of contemporary philosophers have advanced the idea of a return to Aristotle's ethics of virtue.
They suggest that modern moral philosophy is "bankrupt", and that, it needs to be salvaged from
the its bankruptcy (Rachels 1999:176). The foremost person to advance this radical idea was G.
E. M. Anscombe in her article entitled: "Modern Moral Philosophy", which was published in 1958.
In that article, she suggests that the modern moral philosophy is misguided because it rests on
the incoherent notion of a "law" without a lawgiver. Anscombe posits that the very concepts of
duty, obligation, rightness and wrongness, on which modern moral philosophy have focused
attention, are connected to this incoherent notion. In view of this, she opines that philosophers
should cease from thinking about such moral principles as duty, obligation, and rightness, and
return to ethics of virtue as conceptualized by Aristotle (Rachels 1999:177). Apart from
Anscombe, other moral philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Mayo,
Edmund Pincoffs and Richard Taylor have in their respective works (see references), equally
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expressed their dissatisfaction with the promises of the mainstream of the modern ethical
tradition and argues for a return to a virtue based ethical system (Pojman 1999:159). Such
deficiencies found in the 'principle' or 'rule-governed' ethics such as the overemphasis on the
principle of autonomy (as in Kant), the absence of motivational component, and over
dependence on rules without reference to their origin are seen to be addressed by virtue ethics. 
Despite the calls for a return to ethics of virtue, there are some fundamental problems that
are inherent in the theory. The greatest of them is the claim that right actions must be understood
by reference to virtue. In other words, an action is right if and only if it comforms to virtue.
Ordinarily, it should have been the other way round. This seems to be a misplacement of order
because it is quite difficult to justify why virtue should enjoy such priority. This vulnerable point
we find in virtue ethics is similar to the problem with the Divine command Theory which holds that
what makes an action right is the fact that it is commanded by the 'gods', because such
commands are what creates our duty. Virtue ethics, thus, shares a basic structure and a basic
weakness with the Divine command theory. 
In addition to the foregoing, this paper shares the view that what counts as virtue changes
over time and from place to place, and in different circumstances and situations (Pojman
1999:167). The contemporary situationist ethical theory of Joseph Fletcher is a good example
(see Fletcher 1966). Whereas, Aristotle regards pride as a virtue, Christian ethics sees it as a
terrible vice. Again, whereas Marxists see acquisitiveness as a vice, Capitalists regards it as a
virtue (Pence 1984: 282). In his work, The Prince, Machiavelli speaks of need for virtue,
especially for new princes who wish to establish and maintain wholly new states. The 'virtue'
(virtu in Italian) which Machiavelli introduces, obviously, contradicts most of our traditionally
cherished ideals of virtue. For example, he encourages craftiness, stinginess, lying and brutality
as mean of acquiring and retaining political power. This is an effrontery and a big challenge to
Aristotle's ethics of virtue. We shall examine other problems associated with Aristotle's virtue
ethics in the next section.
A critical appraisal of Aristotle's virtue ethics
Beyond every reasonable doubt, Aristotle stands out as one of the greatest moral philosophers
the world has ever known. His ethics of virtue, no doubt, represents an exciting and practical
moral tradition in antiquity which has continued to generate contemporary ethical debates.
Aristotle's emphasis on the importance and indispensability of moral character which is virtue
driven is quite commendable. This may have informed the calls in contemporary times for a
return to Aristotle's eudaimonistic, virtue ethical tradition as we have already discussed in the
preceding section. 
However, one of the perennial problems associated with Aristotle' virtue ethics is that it
provides no guidance on how to resolve ethical dilemmas (Louden 1984: 311-320). In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle did not say enough about what we are supposed to do. He gives
detailed descriptions of many of the virtues, moral and intellectual, but with a persistent 'air of
indeterminacy'. Aristotle gives an outline of pairs of contrary vices that contrast with each of the
virtues, but says very little about where or how to draw the dividing lines and where or how to fix
the golden mean (Mackie 1977:186). The work does not contain any additional help, but is
merely self contained truism which lacks external clue that drives moral actions. Aristotle's virtue
ethics is like telling someone to act as he should act. In other words, "Do what a good person
would do" (Pojman 1999: 168). This implies that if a person knows how to act he will not need
anyone to counsel or guide him on how to do so. In this circumstance, there are no moral role
Models, or exemplar model, or an ideal type. How, then, do we decide who becomes our role
model in a situation where different people endorse different candidates? Obviously, this
situation will lead to ethical pluralism which reduces 'virtue' to something of personal choice. In
other words, moral standards will differ from people to people, culture to culture. This would
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mean that a virtuous action can only be defined from a relative perspective and there would be
no consensus on what is a virtuous act. The necessary concomitant is the problem of virtue
relativism. Some of the things Aristotle regards as virtues may count as vices and vice-versa for
some people and in some places today, for example, pride, liberality and gentleness. 
Further, Aristotle posits that "Virtue is however concerned with emotions and actions ..."
(Ethics Bk 3:53). The epistemological problem here lies with knowing what emotions and actions
that are the right virtues. Is there any objective way of knowing who a virtuous person is? Are
there specific or objective principles of determining a virtuous emotion and action?. This appears
unaddressed by Aristotle. Frankena, apparently referring to this problem, argues that "Virtues
without principles are blind". He is simply saying that virtues need a framework, or action-guiding
principles to direct it. 
Morever, this paper specifically, challenges Aristotle's thesis that happiness is an end (in
every realm of existence). Given that Aristotle was basically concerned with the details of every
day normative ethics – how people ought to behave or conduct themselves in society, he failed
to carry the concept of happiness beyond the physical, transient world. Aristotle focused, primari-
ly, on practical human interest, and consequently, restricted his idea of happiness to what he de-
scribed as “the function of man”. He believed that “happiness is the supreme practical good”
(Ethics Bk 1, 1), and thus, overlooked some metaphysical dimensions of happiness. 
At this juncture, it is quite germane to point out that Aristotle followed Plato in such basic
conceptions of his ethical theory more closely than in any other aspect of his philosophical spec-
ulations (Lamprecht 1955: 61). However, Aristotle was not consistent in following the platonic tra-
dition to a logical conclusion. If we accept Plato’s idea of the immortality of the soul and
Aristotle’s view that happiness is the activity of the soul according to reason, it follows then, that
the concept of happiness transcends the physical existential happiness to which Aristotle con-
fined it. 
In being more consistent with the platonic tradition, this paper posits that happiness, in the
physical realm, may not absolutely be an end since it can only serve some temporal physical
ends and nothing more. For those who accept that the soul of man is immortal, it is logical to say
that our physical existential experiences cannot give us lasting happiness in the practical sense
as Aristotle claimed, because of their ephemerality. At best we can only enjoy temporal happi-
ness, if such exists, in the physical realm as a means to an end. The reason is that ultimate and
absolute happiness may not be possible in a world were both good and evil are mutually
inclusive. Moreover, it is obvious that those who lack the requisite mental capacities articulated
by Aristotle may not achieve happiness in their life time. Happiness, therefore, as a transcendent
good, can only be an end in the ideal world where the soul is free from the constraints and con-
taminations of the physical world.
The possibility of a third dimension: an eclectic approach
Beyond the positions of Plato and Aristotle on the issue of happiness and what actually
constitute the highest good, there is the possibility of a third dimensional moral approach. This
approach is eclectic and it is based on the view that the highest good for humans does not
consist in the realization of a particular intrinsic good to the exclusion of other possibilities.
Happiness is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted concept which can be viewed from different
idealistic, realistic and pluralistic perspectives. Virtues such as pleasure, knowledge, justice,
freedom and moderation are all possible constituents of the highest good. Consequently, to
narrow down our summum bonum to the pursuit of happiness alone as Aristotle did, or to narrow
it down to justice and the knowledge of the forms as Plato did, will be too restrictive. For
example, Joseph Fletcher considers love is the highest good. To some other people, such as
Jean Paul Sartre, freedom is the highest good and that is what happiness means to them.
Dostoevsky's 'underground man' was willing to give up everything, not only success and
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pleasure but even his health, just in order to realize his 'most advantageous advantage', his
freedom (Solomon 1997:296). 
As we have seen so far from Aristotle, the rational eudaimonist ranks activities according to
reason as the highest attainable good. This position sees happiness as an intrinsic end, in an
exclusive sense. However, this view only represents an aspect of reality. All other goods
considered as intrinsic by some other philosophers, such as freedom, justice, knowledge,
success and love should also be considered as ends worthy of pursuit in their own respects.
Human beings are not only pleasure seekers, they are also knowledge seekers, power seekers,
freedom seekers, love seekers, and so on. A person's eudaimonia is rational, if it consists in the
seeking of knowledge; insofar as he/she wills, his/her eudaimonia consists in the cultivation of
virtue; insofar as he/she is feeling; his/her eudamonia consists in the experience of pleasure. Our
highest good is to realize so far as possible every intrinsic good, in such balance and proportion
as our natural endowments and circumstances may permit (Halverson 1967: 280).
Our argument here is that, human beings are multidimensional entities, having diverse
needs and aspirations. Some goods are considered intrinsically valuable while others are
instrumental depending on circumstances and situations. To treat one of the various intrinsic
goods as the only summum bonum will be parochial and unfair. For example, happiness is
impossible without love and freedom. We may as well consider these as ultimate values in
themselves. Human experiences differ, so do our values and beliefs. Moral eclectics, thus,
argue, that all these factors should be considered while assigning values to goods, either as
means or end. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored and evaluated Aristotle’s concept of happiness in all its
ramifications. His realism informed his rejection of transcendent good (happiness being the
highest good) as something attainable. This paper raises objection to Aristotle’s confinement of
happiness to a “practical good” without regard to man’s metaphysical make-up. In this
circumstance, we conclude that his idea of happiness does not make it an absolute end since the
soul transcends the physical realm. We have also argued that one or two dimensional
approaches to the issue of happiness and the question of the highest good (summum bonus), as
in Plato and Aristotle is quite inadequate. To this end, we have explored the possibility of a third
dimension, which is eclectic in nature. It is argued that happiness may not stand alone as the
ultimate end without other intrinsically valuable goods such as love and freedom, which also may
be considered as end in themselves.
We have also done a critique of Aristotle's ethics of virtue in its basic form. It has been
argued that moral virtues are a necessary component, but not a sufficient condition for
happiness. Some external circumstances beyond a person's control could prevent even those
capable of developing moral dispositions from reaching the goal of happiness. A person, in
addition to having virtuous character, needs to be principled, wise, healthy and wealthy (Pojman
1999:164). It has also been pointed out that Aristotle's virtue ethics lacks guiding principles for
determining how to act. 
However, despite the criticisms we have advanced against Aristotle's concept of happiness
as an end, his virtue ethics remains one of the most articulate, far-reaching and influential
system of moral thought ever put together by any philosopher.
References
Aristotle.1996. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Harris Rackham. London: Wordsworth): 203-
209, 258-273.
Barcalow, E. 1994. Moral Philosophy: Theory and Issues. Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishers.
62 
Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2018, 10(1)
Composta, D. 1988. History of Ancient Philosophy. Italy: Urbana University Press.
Durant, W. 1961. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Ezedike, E. U. 2014. "Aristotle". In A. F. Uduigwomen and C. A. Udofia (Eds). A Critical History of 
Philosophy: Ancient and Medieval. Calabar: Ultimate Index Book Publishers:228-80.
Fletcher, J. 1966. Situation Ethics: The New Morally. Philadelphia: Westminster. 
Halverson, W. H. 1967. A Concise Introduction to Philosophy. 3rd ed. New York: Random-
House.
Kant, I. 1959. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Indianapolis. Bobbs-merrill 
Publishers. 
Kolak, D. 1998. The Mayfield Anthology of Western Philosophy. California: Mayfield Publishing.
Landau, R. S. 2012. The Fundamentals of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lamprecht, S.P. 1955. Our Philosophical Traditions: A Brief History Of Philosophy in Western 
Civilization. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Lawhead, W. 2002. The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction Philosophy. Belmont: 
California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
Louden, R. 1984. "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics". American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 311-20
Louden, R. 1992. Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Machiavelli, N. 1940. The Prince and the Discourses. New York: Random House, Modern 
Library. 
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books. 
Ozumba, G. O. 2001. A Course Text on Ethics. Lagos: Obaroh & Ogbinaka Publishers. 
Pojman, L. P.1999. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company. 
Solomon, R.C. 1997. Introducing Philosophy. Problems and Perspectives. New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
Solomon, R. C. 2008. Morality and the Good life: An Introduction to Ethics through Classical 
Sources. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishers.
Stumpf, S.E & Fieser, J. 2003. Philosophy: History and Problems. 6th Edition. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Publishers. 
Taylor, R. 1985. Ethics, Faith and Reason. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Uduigwomen, A.F. 2001. Introducing Ethics: Trends, Problems and Perspectives. Calabar: Pyra-
mid publishers. 
